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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK C. DANIELS, ] 
Third-party Plaintiff ] 
and Appellant, 
vs. ] 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN | 
ASSOCIATION, et al., ] 
Third-party Defendants ] 
and Deseret Federal ] 
Savings & Loan also ] 
Respondent, ] 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK C. DANIELS, et al., ] 
Defendants, 
) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN 
i OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
> Case No. 890208 
\ Category No. 13 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the following issues present special and important-
reasons for granting the appellant's petition for writ of certior-
ari: 
a. Where the owners of a condominium project induce 
the general contractor not to file a notice of lien within 
the statutory filing period, is a lender that records its 
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trust deed after the general contractor records his notice 
of lien estopped from asserting as a defense to the contrac-
tor's foreclosure action the untimeliness of the notice of 
lien? 
b. Did the Court of Appeals clearly err in con-
cluding that the contractor's notice of lien covered his claim 
for "profits" on his investment and not for labor or materials? 
c. Does a decision by a panel of the Court of 
Appeals in which one judge writes an opinion and the other 
two judges concur in the result without written opinion violate 
rule 30(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
found at 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
JURISDICTION 
The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on April 5, 
1989. The Court of Appeals denied the appellant's petition for 
rehearing on April 26, 1989. The jurisdiction of this court is 
based on sections 78-2-2(3)(a), 78-2-2(5) and 78-2a-4 of the Utah 
Code. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves the following statutes and rules, 
the pertinent text of which is set forth in the appendix: Utah 
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Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1988); Rule 30(c), Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
C. Nature of the Case. 
The plaintiff, CEN Corporation, brought this action 
against the appellant, Jack C. Daniels, and other defendants seek-
ing, among other relief, to cancel of record Daniels' notice of 
mechanic's lien. Daniels filed a Third-Party Complaint against, 
among others, the respondent, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Association, seeking to foreclose his mechanic's lien. 
D« Course of the Proceedings. 
Deseret Federal filed a motion to dismiss Daniels' Third-
Party Complaint for failure to state a claim on the grounds that 
his notice of lien was not timely filed. By a memorandum decision 
dated April 6, 1984, the trial court held that Daniels' notice of 
lien was not timely filed and that Deseret Federal was not estopped 
from raising the untimely filing as a defense. The court there-
fore held that Daniels' lien was null and void as to Deseret 
Federal, and granted Deseret Federal's motion. A summary judgment 
was entered in favor of Deseret Federal, and Daniels appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial 
court and denied Daniels' petition for rehearing. 
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F. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. In 1980 a joint venture known as Park Avenue Develop-
ment Company was formed to develop an eight-unit condominium project 
in Park City, Utah. Daniels invested $28,000 in a limited part-
nership that was one of the joint venturers. 
2. On August 14, 1980, Park Avenue entered into a 
Building Contract Agreement with Daniels whereby Daniels was to 
serve as the general contractor for the project. Record at 163. 
(A copy of the contract is included in the appendix to Daniels' 
Petition.) 
3. The contract provided that Daniels was to be paid 
$797,000 for "work and materials" plus an additional $80,253 "profit 
and overhead." See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, appendix; 
Deposition of Jack C. Daniels (hereinafter "Daniels Depo.") at 
22-23.* Although Daniels' testimony was less than clear as to what 
the "profit" was for, see Daniels Depo. at 54-60, he unequivocally 
testified that he was paid $15,000 for his labor in supervising 
construction, that the $80,253 was in addition to any construction 
funds covered by the construction loan, that he expected the profit 
to be paid from the proceeds from the sale of the units and that 
the $80,253 was not supposed to compensate him for his work on or 
materials supplied to the project. JEd. at 55, 58-59 & 75-78. 
1
 The cited pages from the Daniels Depo. are included in 
the Appendix. 
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4. On July 30, 1981, all construction called for by 
the Building Contract Agreement had been completed. Id. at 46-48 
5. As of July 30, 1981, Daniels had not been paid any 
of the $80,253 "overhead and profit" despite the fact that there 
was $13,000 remaining in the construction loan. JEd. at 55 & 63. 
6. In late October or early November 1981, one of the 
project owners asked Daniels not to file a mechanic's lien and 
told him that if he did not, his claim for the $80,253 would be 
paid within two weeks. Record at 84, 136. Daniels was not paid 
the $80,253 within two weeks. Id. at 149. 
7. On or about December 1, 1981, several water pipes 
in the eight-plex broke. Daniels returned to the job site on 
December 1, 1981, to inspect the pipes but did no work on the 
building at that time. Daniels Depo. at 49-51, 65-66. 
8. On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a Notice of Lien 
with the Summit County Recorder claiming he had not been paid the 
$80,253 and claiming that he had furnished the last labor on the 
project on December 1, 1981. Record at 36. 
9. On February 25, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee 
of the Third Judicial District Court entered an Order Discharging 
Claims, which ordered that Daniels' recorded claims be released 
from the project and that they have no effect as a lien on the 
project upon the posting of a $75,000 bond. Id. at 13. 
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10. Daniels did not object to the sufficiency of the 
bond, and a $75,000 bond was posted. See id. at 9. 
11. On March 1, 1982, Deseret Federal recorded a deed 
of trust securing repayment of a note made by the then-owners of 
the project. Id. at 145. 
12. On February 18, 1983, the court entered an Amended 
Order restoring Daniels' lien. id. at 138. 
13. On October 21, 1983, Daniels filed his Third-Party 
Complaint seeking to foreclose his claimed mechanic's lien, which 
he asserted was prior to Deseret Federal's interest in the property, 
id. at 149. 
14. On April 6, 1984, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
granted Deseret Federal's motion to dismiss. He held that Daniels' 
notice of lien was not timely filed because Daniels' activities 
in December 1981 were insufficient to extend the time in which to 
file his lien.* Daniels does not contest that determination for 
purposes of his petition. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8. 
15. Judge Fishier also concluded that Deseret Federal 
was not estopped from raising the untimely filing as a defense 
because there was no evidence of concealment, misrepresentation 
1
 Section 38-1-7 of the Utah Code requires that a notice 
of lien be filed within 100 days after the completion of an original 
contractor's contract. Because Daniels' activities in December 
1981 did not extend the statutory filing period, the notice of 
lien recorded February 3, 1982—some six months after the contract 
was completed—was clearly untimely. 
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or other act by Deseret Federal upon which an estoppel could be 
based. Record at 238* 
16. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
ruling in an opinion written by the Honorable Richard C. Davidson 
with the Honorable Regnal1 W. Garff and Norman H. Jackson concurr 
in the result without written opinion. The Court of Appeals agre< 
with the trial court's conclusion that Daniels' notice of lien 
was untimely and that the work he did in December 1981 did not 
extend the time for filing his notice of lien. 771 P.2d at 1102. 
The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Daniels' estoppel 
argument because it found that Daniels' claim for the $80,253 was 
not a claim for the value of the service Daniels rendered, the 
labor he performed or the materials or equipment he furnished for 
the construction or improvement of the condominium project. Id. 
at 1102-03. Accordingly, Daniels' notice of lien was invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
A party seeking review by writ of certiorari must show 
"special and important reasons" for granting review. R. Utah S. 
Ct. 43. Rule 43 of this Court gives four examples of reasons that 
might justify review by writ of certiorari: 
(1) when there is a conflict between decisions of 
separate panels of the Court of Appeals; 
(2) when the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of law in a way that conflicts with a decision of this Court; 
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(3) when the Court of Appeals' decision "has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this court's power 
of supervision"; and 
(4) when the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
and unsettled question of law that should be settled by this 
Court. 
None of these factors are present here, and there are not other 
"special and important reasons" for granting review in this case. 
I. DANIELS' ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT DOES NOT RAISE AN 
IMPORTANT AND UNSETTLED QUESTION OF STATE LAW. 
Daniels argues that whether or not an owner can be es-
topped from asserting that a mechanic's lien is invalid because 
notice of the lien was not timely recorded is an important question 
of state law that should be decided by this Court. However, that 
issue is not the issue in this case. The issue in this case is 
whether a mortgagee who did nothing to induce a mechanic to refrain 
from filing his notice of lien should be estopped from contesting 
the timeliness of the notice. 
This Court has previously held that failure to comply 
with the time requirements of the mechanic's lien statute forecloses 
a claimant's statutorily created rights and is therefore not "sub-
ject to waiver or estoppel." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & 
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Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-91 (Utah 1986).z AAA is settled la 
and is dispositive of this case. 
However, even if AAA were not controlling, this Court 
should not grant certiorari to decide the abstract question of 
whether a mortgagee can ever be estopped from contesting the time-
liness of a lien because, even if estoppel were possible, Deseret 
Federal could not be estopped under the facts of this case. 
This Court has stated under what circumstances a mort-
gagee may be estopped from claiming priority over a mechanic's lie 
H[T]o establish an estoppel against a mortgagee, the lien claimant 
must show some concealment, misrepresentation, act, or declaration 
by the mortgagee upon which the lienholder properly relied and by 
which he was induced to act differently than he would otherwise 
have acted." Utah Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 
366 P.2d 598, 602 (1961). Accord In re Williamson, 43 Bankr. 813, 
824-25 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (lienholders' estoppel argument failed 
where the lien notices were attacked by a creditor who had nothing 
to do with creating the defective notices) (applying Utah law). 
In other words, the mortgagee must have done something that would 
make it unjust for him to deny the lienholder's priority. It is 
undisputed in this case that Deseret Federal did nothing to induce 
Daniels not to file his notice of lien. For that reason, the trial 
^ This conclusion is supported by sound policy reasons, 
as Deseret Federal argued in the Court of Appeals. See Brief of 
Respondent at 25-30, 32-33. 
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court properly held Deseret Federal could not be estopped from 
contesting the lien's validity. 
Daniels argues that Deseret Federal should nevertheless 
be estopped because the owner of the property should be estopped, 
and Deseret Federal, Daniels claims, was in privity with the owner. 
Utah law recognizes that, under certain circumstances, 
one party may be estopped by the conduct of another. However, 
there must be good reasons for imputing the conduct of one party 
to an innocent third party. The only reason Daniels gives for 
imputing the owner's conduct to Deseret Federal is that Deseret 
Fedpral acquired its interest in the property through the owner. 
However, a grantor-grantee relationship alone is insufficient to 
impute the conduct of a grantor to the grantee in a case such as 
this. 
Daniels argues that, under Utah law, a subsequent owner 
is estopped by the conduct of his predecessor-in-title. He relies 
on Smith v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 30 Utah 246, 84 P. 108 (1906). 
In that case, the railroad's predecessor-in-interest entered upon 
<u tract of land in 1874 without the owner's permission, built a 
railroad on the land and, for nearly thirty years, operated the 
railroad without any objection or protest from the owner of the 
land. In fact, the owner built fences on each side of the tract 
to keep his livestock from straying onto the track. In 1900, the 
railroad removed the fences, without permission or objection, and 
- 10 -
built new fences enclosing an additional strip of land on each 
side of its track. In 1903, the owner conveyed the land to Smith 
who brought an action in ejectment against the railroad. The tri 
court awarded Smith damages for the additional strips of land en-
closed by the railroad in 1900, but denied him relief as to the 
remainder of the property, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
Daniels takes one sentence from the court's opinion out 
of context to support his argument that anyone holding under an 
owner is estopped by the conduct of the owner. The Court stated, 
"Of course, if [Smith's] grantor at the time of his conveyance 
was estopped from maintaining an action of ejectment for the addi-
tional strips taken, then likewise is [Smith] estopped from main-
taining such an action." 30 Utah at 250. However, it is clear 
from the rest of the court's opinion that, if the actions of Smith 
predecessor-in-title estopped Smith, it was only because those 
actions had created in the railroad a possessory interest in the 
property.3 
3 According to the court, the trial court's findings showed 
that the property 
was entered upon thirty years ago, permanent 
and valuable improvements were made thereon, 
and it was, during all that time, continuously 
and exclusively occupied by the [railroad] 
and its predecessors for railroad purposes 
without objection or interruption. From these 
facts, a license to occupy may well be implied, 
and, at the time of the conveyance, respondent's 
grantor would be estopped from ejecting the 
[railroad]. 
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In this case, the actions of the owner that Daniels claims 
give rise to an estoppel would merely estop the owner from asserting 
the untimeliness of the notice of lien. They would not create in 
Daniels any possessory interest in the property. Therefore, Smith 
provides no basis for finding that Deseret Federal was estopped 
by the owner's actions. 
Daniels also relies on Rice v. Granite School District, 
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), in which the Court held that 
a school district could be estopped by the actions of its insurer 
from asserting the untimeliness of the plaintiff's notice of a 
claim. However, the Court noted that the statute requiring notice 
expressly authorized the insurer to deal directly with the claimant 
on behalf of the school district and to approve or deny the claim. 
The court stated: 
Implicit within this statutory designation 
of the insurance carrier to deal directly with 
the claimant is the acknowledgment that the 
insurance carrier's conduct may be such as to 
support an estoppel. . . . [W]e are not con-
fronted by a fact situation wherein the agent's 
actions were not authorized by statute, and 
the governmental entity could not be estopped 
to assert the statute of limitations. 
456 P.2d at 161. 
30 Utah at 249. Although the court spoke of "a license to occupy," 
it is clear that the facts stated would also support a prescriptive 
easement. See, e.g., Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238, 61 P. 1006 
(1900); Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891) 
(prescriptive rights to an easement can arise from use of the ease-
ment for a period of twenty years). 
- 12 -
In this case, the court was confronted with the fact 
situation not present in Rice: Here, the owner was not authorize 
by statute to act for Deseret Federal, the mortgagee. Thus, Rice 
clearly does not apply to this case, and Deseret Federal cannot 
be estopped to assert a timeliness defense,4 
Finally, Daniels argues that Deseret Federal should be 
estopped because his notice of lien, which appeared timely on its 
face, at least put Deseret Federal on inquiry notice. However, 
had Deseret Federal inquired before it recorded its trust deed, 
it would have discovered Judge Dee's order releasing Daniels' clai 
Although Daniels' claim was later restored, Deseret Federal would 
have been justified in relying on Judge Dee's order when it record 
its trust deed and should therefore not be estopped from contestin 
the validity of Daniels' lien.5 
q
 Daniels also cites Belt Line Brick Co. v. Standard Home 
Bldq. Co., 170 Minn. 509, 213 N.W. 41 (1927). The court in that 
case upheld the trial court's findings that the owner of property 
was estopped by its conduct from asserting that a lien statement 
was filed too late and that the owner's grantee, who acquired the 
property after the filing of the lien statement, was "also subject 
to such estoppel." The court did not explain the basis for its 
holding, and, to the extent that it recognizes estoppel and appears 
to impute the conduct of an owner to his successors-in-interest, 
it "seems to be contrary to Utah law." Record at 238. Of course, 
the fact that Minnesota law on this issue may be contrary to Utah 
law does not mean that Utah law on the issue is unsettled. 
5
 The facts of this case do not clearly present the estoppe 
issue for another reason: Daniels admitted in his brief in the 
Court of Appeals that he went along with the owner's request that 
he not file a notice of lien so that the owner could get refinancing 
for the property. Appellant's Brief at 4. In other words, Daniels 
knowingly participated in the owner's plan to induce Deseret Federa. 
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In short, there is no reason for this court to review the 
decisions of the lower courts, which are fully supported by well-
settled Utah law on estoppel. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
DANIELS' CLAIM WAS NOT LIENABLE, AND ANY ALLEGED 
ERROR IN THAT DETERMINATION WAS HARMLESS. 
The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Daniels' 
estoppel argument because, it held, even if Daniels had filed a 
timely notice for the $80,253 owing him as "profit and overhead," 
he could not claim a lien for that amount since his claim was for 
"profits he was entitled to as an investor," which are not lien-
able.6 771 P.2d at 1103. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion is supported by the 
record. Daniels was the general contractor on the project. All 
of the actual work on the project was subcontracted out. The only 
work that Daniels did on the project was to supervise construction, 
for which he was paid. Presumably, the amount he was paid for 
his time in supervision would have included any "profit" he was 
entitled to under the contract. Although he figured his $80,253 
profit as a percentage of the total construction loan, the $80,253 
to lend money secured by the property by making it appear that 
the property was unencumbered. Thus, if anyone should have been 
estopped it was Daniels. 
6 Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code gives a contractor a 
lien on property "for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented" by him. 
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was to be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of the project 
and not as a construction draw, suggesting that it was meant as 
investor profit and not as payment under the construction contrac 
Daniels claims that the $80,253 "profit and overhead" 
was simply the "plus" portion of a "cost-plus" contract, not inve 
tor profit. He further claims that the Court of Appeals' decisio: 
precludes a contractor from recovering his profit and overhead 
under a cost-plus contract and eliminates owners as a class from 
mechanic's lien rights, warranting this Court's review in the exei 
cise of its supervisory powers. 
Of course, the Court of Appeals did not hold that a con-
tractor cannot claim a lien for the "plus" portion of a "cost-plus 
contract, nor did it hold that owners cannot claim mechanic's lien 
Rather, the Court of Appeals concluded that Daniels' claim was 
for investor profits, which are clearly not lienable, and not for 
Daniels' profit as a general contractor. 
Deseret Federal concedes that the purpose of the $80,253 
is not clear from the record. However, whether the money was meant 
as investor profit or something else, the Court of Appeals reached 
the right conclusion. Whatever the $80,253 was for, it was clearly 
not simply the "plus" portion of a cost-plus contract. A contrac-
tor's legitimate profit margin, under either a cost-plus or a fixed 
dollar contract, is part of the value of his labor and materials 
on the project. Daniels unequivocally testified that the $80,253 
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was not supposed to compensate him for his work on the project or 
for any materials supplied to the project. Daniels Depo. at 78. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Daniels' $80,253 
"profit" was for something other than his services, labor or 
materials provided as general contractor and was not lienable. 
At best, Daniels' argument raises a factual question as 
to the purpose of the $80,253 "profit." That question, however, 
does not justify granting certiorari because it is irrelevant under 
the facts of this case. The trial court's conclusion that Daniels' 
lien was untimely and hence invalid is amply supported by the record 
and is not contested. If Daniels' lien is invalid because he did 
not timely record a notice of his lien, it does not matter what 
the lien was for. Because the Court of Appeals' alleged error 
would make no difference in the outcome of this case, this Court 
should not grant review. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS COMPLIES WITH 
RULE 30(c) OF ITS RULES, AND ANY ALLEGED VIOLATION 
OF THAT RULE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL OR 
IMPORTANT REASON FOR GRANTING REVIEW. 
This matter was heard by a panel of the Court: of Appeals 
consisting of Judges Davidson, Garff and Jackson. Judge Davidson 
wrote the opinion for the Court, and Judges Garff and Jackson con-
curred in the result. Daniels claims that an opinion by the court 
in which two judges on a three-judge panel concur in the result 
without written opinion violates rule 30(c) of the Rules of the 
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Utah Court of Appeals and thus departs so far from "the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for the 
exercise of this court's power of supervision" under rule 43(3) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Daniels' argument must fail for a simple reason: The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals complies with rule 30(c). Rule 
30(c) states: 
When a judgment, decree or order is re-
versed, modified or affirmed by the court, 
the reasons therefor shall be stated concisely 
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any judge 
on the panel concurring or dissenting therefrom 
may likewise give the reasons in writing and 
file the same with the clerk. 
(Emphasis added). 
Rule 30(c) only requires that the court state reasons 
for its decision in writing. Judge Davidson's opinion does just 
that. It states the judgment of the court and states reasons 
therefor. Judge Davidson's reasons may not have been the same 
reasons that Judges Garff and Jackson may have given for the deci-
sion, but rule 30(c) does not require all judges on a panel to 
agree as to their reasons or even to state their reasons. Any 
judge on the panel concurring in the result "may" give his or her 
reasons in writing, but he or she is not required to do so. 
Daniels claims that, under rule 30(c), the court's writte 
opinion must state the reasons of a majority of the court, or else 
a majority of the court must write separate opinions. The rule, 
- 17 -
by its terms, contains no such requirement, nor does logic dictate 
such a result. 
Under Daniels' first alternative, there could be no judg-
ment of an appellate court unless a majority of the members of 
the court agreed not only on the judgment but also on the reasons 
for the judgment. Where, as often happens, the judges could not 
agree on their specific reasons for the court's decision, litigants 
would be consigned to a perpetual appellate limbo. Such a result 
is clearly not required by rule 30(c). And Daniels' second alter-
native (requiring separate opinions from a majority of the court) 
would only multiply paper, obscure the court's conclusion and lead 
to needless parsing of judicial opinions.^ Such a result may be 
appropriate for the House of Lords but is not required of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Even if Daniels' construction of rule 30(c) were correct, 
the Court of Appeals' alleged failure to comply with the rule would 
be harmless. All three judges on the panel agreed that the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. The remedy for any failure 
to comply with rule 30(c) would be to remand this matter to the 
Court of Appeals to allow either Judge Garff or Judge Jackson to 
write his reasons for concurring in the judgment. If the Court 
1
 It would also provide reviewing courts with alternative 
grounds on which to affirm lower courts' judgments, which might 
benefit respondents but would hardly help petitioners such as 
Daniels. 
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of Appeals' decision is supportable on the grounds stated by Judg 
Davidson—and it is—any reasons Judges Garff or Jackson gave for 
concurring in the judgment would not provide any basis for review 
by certiorari. Hence, the end result would be the same—the judg« 
ment of the court would stand—and any error would be harmless. 
Finally, Daniels' argument, even if well taken, does 
not justify granting review. Rule 30(c) was promulgated under 
authority of this Court, and this Court is the ultimate interprets 
of the rule. If, as Daniels suggests, the rule is unclear, this 
Court can amend the rule to clarify it without having to grant 
review by certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Daniels' Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari does not present "special and important reasons" 
for this Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision. His peti-
tion should therefore be denied. 
DATED this XI ™ day of July, 1989. 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of July, 1989, to: 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq. 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
225 South 200 East #150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alter-
ation, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service ) :n-
dered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1372, 
1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27, § 12; C.L. 
1917, §§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973, ch. 73, § 1; 
1981, ch. 170, § 1; 1987, ch. 170, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment deleted "all persons who shall do work or 
furnish materials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit" 
following "manner" in the first sentence, re-
wrote the second sentence so as to delete a pro-
vision relating to the interest of a lessee of a 
mining claim, and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
Cross-References. — Bond to protect me-
chanics and materialmen under private con-
tracts, § 14-2-1. 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, or modify any 
order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a case are incom-
plete, the court may order the trial court or agency to supplement, modify, or 
complete the findings to make them conform to the issues presented and the 
facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial court or agency to 
enter judgment in accordance with the findings as revised. The court may also 
order a new trial or further proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is 
granted, the court may pass upon and determine all questions of law involved 
in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final determina-
tion of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a 
new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified by the court, the judgment or 
order affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judg-
ment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or affirmed by the court, the 
reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk. 
Any judge on the panel concurring or dissenting therefrom may likewise give 
the reasons in writing and file the same with the clerk. The entry by the clerk 
in the records of the court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the 
court. 
(d) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the 
clerk shall give notice thereof to the respective parties and make the decision 
public. 
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5123 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
PARK CITY INVESTORS I, A 
CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
D/B/A PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, EUGENE E. DOMS AND 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS 
C.E.N. CORPORATION, A UTAH 
CORPORATION, ET AL., 
DEFENDANTS. 
DEPOSITION OF: 
JACK DANIELS 
CIVIL NO. C83-050<+A 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 3QTH DAY OF 
SEPTEMBER, 1933, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 2:00 P.M., THE 
DEPOSITION OF JACK DANIELS WAS TAKEN IN THE LAW OFFICES 
OF KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN, PETERS S GRUNDF0S5EN, 10 EXCHANGE 
PLACE, SUITE 1300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BY EDIJARD P. 
MIDGLEY, RPR, A REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL. REPORTER, AND 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
GERALD H. KINGHORN, ESQUIRE. 10 EXCHANGE PLA 
SUITE 1000, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34111 TELEPHONE 364-86^ 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PARK CITY INVESTORS I AMD EUGENE DOM 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQUIRE, AND KAREN MCCLURG, 
ESQUIRE, KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, 6 00 COMMERCIAL CLUB BUILDING, 
GENERAL COURT REPORTERS 
J DALE J. OHNSON &ASSOCIATES 
Suite 700 
N»wnouse Building 
Salt U n e O t y . Ulan W i l l 
(801) 3*3-2000 
MANAGING PARTNER 
EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q I ' L L FOLLOW UP. 
A NO. 
Q WHAT WAS THE QUESTION ABOUT THE PROFITS THAT CAME 
UP THAT YOU JUST TESTIFIED ABOUT? YOU SAID SOME QUESTION 
CAME UP ABOUT THE PROFIT ON I T , AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT 
THAT? 
A WELL, I THOUGHT WE WAS SPEAKING ON THIS CONTRACT. 
ON THIS CONTRACT THERE WAS A CROSSED-OUT—IT HAD BEEN 
CROSSED OUT, YOU KNOW. I FIGURED WHEN I TYPED THE CONTRACT 
UP I WAS FIGURING THE PROFIT ON $ 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 
Q OKAY. 
A BECAUSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT THE BANK WAS GOING TO 
HOLD BACK AND WHAT THERE WOULD BE I N THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN 
I T S E L F . 
Q OKAY. 
A AND USUALLY I TAKE MY PROFIT FROM THE HARD COST 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION, AND THIS IS WHERE WE WORKED THIS OUT 
AND DERIVED THIS OTHER FIGURE FROM THAT FIGURE AFTER I 
HAD ALL THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF ME. 
Q OKAY. SO THIS FIGURE THAT WAS WRITTEN IN HERE 
ON PAGE 4 OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, IF I CAN READ IT 
UPSIDE DOWN, IS — THERE'S A FIGURE THERE FOR THE MAIN COST 
OF THE BUILDING, WHICH LOOKS LIKE $797,000. 
AND THEN IT SAYS, "PLUS PROFIT AND OVERHEAD OF"--IS 
THAT $ 8 0 , 2 5 3 ? 
GENERAL COURT REPORTERS 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
A WELL, THAT INCLUDED — LET ' S SEE IF I CAN—THIS 
$80,250 INCLUDED THE PROFIT AND OVERHEAD TO THE COMBINED—MOW, 
IT SEEMED TO ME LIKE THE PROFIT, THAT WAS $72,000, AND THE 
OVERHEAD WAS $7,500 OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. AND IT 
TOTALED THE §80,253. 
AND I GOT THAT FROM—AFTER I FOUND OUT THIS FIGURE 
OF $797,000. 
Q SO YOUR PROFIT WAS INTENDED TO BE ROUGHLY 10 PERCENT 
OF THE HARD COST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A RIGHT, AND THAT'S WHAT I FIGURED; 10 PERCENT OF THE 
HARD COST. 
Q OKAY. BEFORE YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT OR GOT THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN, HAD YOU GONE UP TO PARK CITY AND KNOCKED 
DOWN ANY OF THE OLD HOUSES OR DONE ANY CLEARING WORK OR 
ANY EXCAVATION OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT ON THE PROPERTY? 
A NONE WHATSOEVER. I HAD LOOKED AT THE PROPERTY, 
AND I HAD CONTACTED THEM, MY SUBS, TO SEE WHAT I HAD. 
MY EXCAVATOR HAD SEEN THE PROPERTY SO WE COULD SEE 
ABOUT WHAT WE HAD TO DO TO REMOVE THE OLD HOUSES THAT WAS 
ON THE PROPERTY AND LEVEL IT. 
Q WAS THERE A PORTION OF YOUR ESTIMATE THAT WAS 
ALLOCATED TO THE DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOUSES AND SO FORTH? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. 
A NOW, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT WOULD BE. IT WAS A TOTAL 
GENERAL COURT REPORTERS 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
I N S P E C T I O N . AND I THINK THAT I T SHOWS IN THIS BOOK HERE. 
Q LET ME JUST ASK YOU ABOUT THAT, THEN. THIS JUNE 
15TH, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS THE LAST DISBURSEMENT, YOU MAY 
HAVE HAD SOME CLEANUP WORK AND SOME OTHER--MAYBE HAULING OF 
DEBRIS OR LANDSCAPING OR SOME FINAL DETAILS THAT WERE PICKED 
UP ON THE F INAL INSPECTION THAT YOU NEEDED TO COMPLETE; IS . 
THAT— 
A RIGHT. 
Q — A FAIR STATEMENT? 
A THOSE WERE MOSTLY JUST CASH PAYMENTS FOR LABOR AND 
THAT. NOW, OUR FINAL INSPECTION WAS ON THE 23RD. 
MR. MADSEN: DON'T—. 
Q THAT'S ALL RIGHT, YOU'RE REFERRING TO A PARK CITY 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTION REPORT DATED JULY 23 OF 1 9 8 1 , AND 
IS IT YOUR TESTIMONY THAT ON THAT DATE THE BUILDING WAS 
FINALLY INSPECTED BY PARK CITY, AND THAT IT WAS FULLY COMPLETE 
ON THAT DATE? 
A RIGHT. AND IT WAS READY FOR THE OCCUPANCY REPORT 
TO BE'ISSUED. 
Q AND THEY ISSUED AN OCCUPANCY CERTIFICATE AT THAT 
TIME; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. MADSEN: THREE DAYS LATER. 
Q O R — . 
A IT WAS TWO OR THREE DAYS. 
Q WELL, YOU WERE ENTITLED TO ONE ON THE 23RD OF JULY; 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A RIGHT. I COMPLIED WITH—THERE WERE TWO OR THREE 
ITEMS THAT HAD TO BE FIXED. 
Q WHAT WERE THOSE ITEMS? 
A I HAVE NO IDEA, AND I DON'T KNOW WHY THAT INSPECTION 
REPORT IS. 
MR. MADSEN: THAT'S THE ONE WE TRIED TO LOCATE. 
A PARK CITY HAS IT. 
Q DID YOU FURNISH THOSE ITEMS? 
A WELL, YES. 
Q BUT YOU CAN'T RECALL WHAT THEY WERE? 
A NO, THEY WAS MINOR LITTLE--LIKE I THINK WE HAD 
TO HAVE A HANDRAIL ON THE DRIVEWAY BECAUSE THE INCLINE WAS 
MORE THAN TWO FEET OVER A GIVEN DISTANCE, OR 18 INCHES OVER 
A GIVEN DISTANCE. SO WE HAD TO FURNISH A HANDRAIL FROM THE 
SIDEWALK TO THE BUILDING. 
THE OTHER ONE WAS A MINOR ELECTRICAL — MAYBE A 
SWITCH THAT DIDN'T WORK OR SOMETHING, I DON'T RECALL. BUT 
THEY WAS VERY MINOR. 
IN FACT IT VMS AMAZING FOR THAT SIZE BUILDING WITH 
EIGHT UNITS IN IT—MOST BUILDERS WOULD HAVE GOT FOUR OR FIVE 
SHEETS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TO GO BACK AND REPAIR. 
Q WITH REFERENCE TO THIS RAILING, WHEN WAS THE 
RAILING INSTALLED? 
A I DON'T KNOW. 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHO YOU HAD DO THAT FOR YOU? 
A I HAD ORNAMENTAL IRON? IT WAS A FELLOW I USED 
DOWN IN SALT LAKE. IT WAS INTERMOUNTAIN ORNAMENTAL IRON. 
THEY'RE DOWN IN DRAPER. 
Q THEY WENT UP AND INSTALLED IT? 
A YES. 
Q WHEN WAS THAT DONE? YOUR RECOLLECTION IS THE 
BUILDING WAS COMPLETED—. 
A THE BUILDNG WAS ABSOLUTELY COMPLETED WHEN I WAS 
f 
ISSUED THAT OCCUPANCY REPORT, AND THAT WAS ISSUED ON THE 
30TH OF JULY. 
Q OKAY. DO I UNDERSTAND, THEN, THAT THESE OTHER 
LITTLE MINOR THINGS WERE DONE BETWEEN THE 23RD, THE DATE OF 
THE FINAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, AND THE 30TH, THE DAY THAT THE--, 
A NO, NO; NO, OUR FINAL—THAT INSPECTION, THE FINAL 
INSPECTION REPORT WE GOT WAS ON THE 23RD OF JULY. 
NOW, THEY HAD COME OLT, AND THIS IS WHERE WE 
DON'T HAVE THAT RECORD, THAT NEXT-TO-LAST INSPECTION REPORT. 
I DON'T KNOW, I THOUGHT I HAD GIVEN IT TO YOU. 
BUT THEY MARKED DOWN, LIKE I SAY, THREE ITEMS THAT 
HAD NOT MET WITH THEIR CODE. SO WE RE-REPAIRED THOSE, CALLED 
THEM BACK, AND THEY COME OUT ON THE 23RD OF JULY AND 
INSPECTED THE BUILDING AND GIVE US THE FINAL OKAY FOR AN 
OCCUPANCY. 
THEN THEY MADE THAT OUT AND HANDED IT TO ME ON THE 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
30TH OF JULY, AND THAT WAS IT. 
Q THAT WAS IT? 
A WELL, NOW, I STILL HELD THE RESPONSIBILITY, YOU KNOW. 
YOU NEVER KNOW ALL OF THE PROBLEMS IN A BUILDING. 
AND THE INSPECTOR DOESN'T KNOW, EITHER. AND 
LIKE A PLUG WON'T WORK OR A FAUCET ISN'T WORKING PROPERLY 
OR A TOILET'S LEAKING, ANY OF THESE THINGS CAN OCCUR. 
WELL, THE BUILDER HAS THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR A 
YEAR AFTER COMPLETION. 
BUT THEY'RE VERY MINOR; USUALLY ANNOYING THINGS, 
BUT FROM THE 30TH OF JULY, THAT BUILDING, AS FAR AS I WAS 
CONCERNED, I HAD COMPLETED MY JOB. 
Q OKAY. DID YOU FURNISH ANY WORK TO THAT BUILDING 
AFTER THE 30TH OF JULY, THAT YOU CAN RECALL? 
NOT UNTIL I WAS CALLED BACK UP ON THE JOB. 
WHEN WAS THAT? 
IT WAS SOMETIME IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER. 
THAT WAS WHEN THE PIPES FROZE AND THE WATER-
YES. 
--BURST AND SO ON? 
YES, THAT WAS IT. 
DID YOU FURNISH ANY WORK ON THE JOB AT THAT DATE? 
I WENT UP AND ASSESSED THE DAMAGE OR LOOKED IT 
OVER TO SEE WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. MCDONALD CALLED ME EARLY 
THAT MORNING AND SAYS, "WE HAVE A PROBLEM UP HERE, COME ON UP." 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
SO I WENT UP, AND I LOOKED IT OVER TO SEE, YOU KNOW, 
WHAT WAS WRONG. AND THE PIPES HAD BROKE, AND IT'S MY 
UNDERSTANDING THE REASON THE PIPES BROKE WAS BECAUSE ALL THE 
HEAT IN THE BUILDING HAD BEEN SHUT OFF. 
NOW, AFTER I HAD GOTTEN THE OCCUPANCY, THE BUILDING 
WAS TURNED OVER TO CRYSTAL DEVELOPMENT. 
THEY WAS THE ONES THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO MANAGE THE 
BUILDING OR SELL IT OR WHATEVER. BUT AS THE CONTRACTOR, YOU 
KNOW, I WAS THROUGH WITH MY PORTION. 
THEN THEY CALLED ME TO COME UP THERE, AND I ASSESSED 
ALL THE DAMAGE AND STARTED TO CALL AROUND TO GET PEOPLE TO 
FIX IT. 
I CALLED THE BANK TO SEE IF THERE WAS INSURANCE 
COVERING THE BUILDING. WELL, I TALKED TO DON NIELSEN AT THAT 
TIME, AND DON TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD--HAD REDUCED THE COVERAGE 
OR SOMETHING, YOU KNOW, SUT THAT THE INSURANCE ON THE BUILDING 
A! THAT TIKE WOULD NOT COVER THE DAMAGE. 
SO I WAS GETTING READY TO GO BACK UP, AND IN THE 
MEANTIME OLD VANCE MCDONALD SAID, "YOU STAY AWAY FROM THE 
BUILDING. WE DON'T NEED YOU UP THERE. WE'LL HANDLE IT 
OURSELVES." 
WELL, CONSEQUENTLY I NEVER WENT BACK UP AND HAD 
ANY MORE TO DO WITH IT BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T WANT ME UP THERE. 
Q IN YOUR MIND, WAS VANCE MCDONALD'S CALL TELLING 
YOU ABOUT THE DAMAGE SOME REQUEST FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
BUILDING? 
A WELL, YEAH. YEAH, I WOULD SAY IT WAS, BECAUSE 
THERE WAS DAMAGE UP THERE AND VANCE COULDN'T HANDLE IT. 
AND I WAS THE CONTRACTOR ON THE BUILDING. I WAS 
ALSO A PARTNER IN THAT THING UP THERE. SO YES, THEY WANTED 
ME BACK UP THERE TO GET IT FIXED. THAT WAS THE WAY I 
INTERPRETED IT. 
Q BETWEEN THE TIME VANCE MCDONALD CALLED YOU ABOUT 
THE WATER DAMAGE AND THE TIME OF THE OCCUPANCY CERTIFICATE, 
DID YOU GO TO PARK CITY OR SEND ANYBODY TO PARK CITY FOR 
ANY REASON TO DO ANYTHING ON THAT BUILDING THAT YOU CAN RECAL 
I REALIZE IT WAS A LONG TIME AGO. 
A NO WORK. NO WORK. THERE WAS NO MORE WORK DONE 
AFTER THAT PERIOD OF TIME THAT WAS IN NEED OF ANYTHING. IF 
IT WAS, I DIDN'T KNOW. I HAD LEFT THE BUILDING AND I WAS 
THROUGH WITH THAT JOB. 
Q OKAY. 
CWHEREUPON, AT THE APPROXIMATE HOUR OF 2:55 
P.M., THE PROCEEDINGS STOOD IN BRIEF RECESS; 
AFTER WHICH, AT THE HOUR OF 3:05 P . M . , THE 
FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED:) 
Q MR. DANIELS, CALLING YOUR ATTENTION TO NOVEMBER AND 
DECEMBER OF 1 9 8 1 , DID YOU HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. LINNE' 
OR WITH MR. DANGERFIELD ABOUT SOME EFFORTS TO CHANGE THIS JOI 
VENTURE AGREEMENT OR ENTER INTO SOME KIND OF NEW AGREEMENT TH, 
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EXAM 3Y KINGHORN 
MADE ME AN OFFER TO GET ME OUT, YOU KNOW. 
AND I D I D N ' T ACCEPT EITHER ONE OF THEM. ONE WAS FOR 
$2 0 , 0 0 0 AND ONE WAS FOR $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . AND BROWN WAS THE ONE THAT 
OFFERED $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . HE STARTED AT $ 5 , 0 0 0 AND WORKED UP TO 
$ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 
Q WHEN YOU SAY "TO GET YOU O U T , " WHAT WAS HE GOING 
TO PAY YOU FOR? WHAT WAS I T SUPPOSED TO BE FOR? 
A WELL, I THINK—I KNOW I HAD TOLD MCCOY I WAS GOING 
TO F I L E THE L I E N ON I T . 
AND MCCOY HAD TALKED ME OUT OF IT EACH TIME. AND 
IT WENT PAST THE LIMIT THAT I COULD FILE THE LIEN AND THEN 
THE WATER BROKE AND I WAS INVOLVED A G A I N , WHICH EXTENDED MY 
TIME LIMIT. AND I WAITED UNTIL ALMOST THAT WAS OVER BEFORE 
I FILED THAT LIEN ON THAT BUILDING. 
Q NOW, I GOT CONFUSED THERE. WAS THAT THE REASON 
YOU AND VERN ROMNEY WENT TO SEE BROWN WAS ABOUT THE L I E N 
OR — . 
A NO, I'M REALLY CLOUDY IN THAT AREA. I DON'T 
KNOW WHETHER IT WAS TO DISCUSS WITH BROWN HIS OFFER OR—REALLY, 
IT'S BEEN SO LONG AGO THAT--AND TEMPERAMENT HAS CHANGED SO 
DRASTICALLY, I JUST DON'T REMEMBER. 
Q MR. DANIELS, WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR BUILDING 
CONTRACT, THERE'S A PROVISION IN THERE FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT 
OF OVERHEAD AND PROFIT OF ABOUT $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 , I F I CAN RECALL, 
WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE DOCUMENT. IS THAT ROUGHLY THE NUMBER 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
THAT YOU RECALL? 
A THAT IS. 
Q WAS THAT OVERHEAD AND PROFIT TO COMPENSATE YOU 
FOR SOMETHING YOU WERE GOING TO DO DURING THE COURSE OF 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDING? 
A NO, THAT WAS MY PROFIT FOR ERECTING THE BUILDING. 
Q W E L L - - . 
A MAYBE I DON'T UNDERSTAND. 
Q WAS THAT SEPARATE AND APART FROM BEING PAID FOR 
SUPERVISING THE BUILDING? 
A OH, YES; DEFINITELY, YES. 
Q SO YOU WERE GOING TO—YOU WERE GOING TO GET P A I D 
FOR SUPERVISING THE BUILDING, AND THEN OVER AND ABOVE THAT 
YOU WERE GOING TO GET PROFITS OF SOME K I N D ; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A T H A T ' S R I G H T . 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY YOU GOT FROM SUPERVISING 
T'-.E 3 U I L D I N G ? 
A $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 
Q OKAY. HAS ANY PART OF THAT $8 0,000 PROFIT FIGURE 
BEEN PAID, TO YOUR MIND? 
A NONE. 
Q YOU'VE BEEN COMPENSATED FOR NONE OF THE OVERHEAD? 
A NONE. I HAVE--I HAVEN'T, NO. I HAVEN'T RECEIVED 
A DIME OTHER THAN THE $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 I WAS PAID FOR S U P E R V I S I O N . 
Q IS IT CUSTOMARY, TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, FOR 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
A CONTRACTOR TO BE PAID FOR SUMS OVER AND ABOVE HIS SUPERVISION 
AND DIRECTION OF THE MATERIALMEN AND SUBCONTRACTORS IN A 
PROJECT? 
A WELL, I CAN'T REALLY ANSWER YOUR QUESTION BECAUSE 
I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU MEAN. 
Q WELL, YOU'VE BEEN A CONTRACTOR FOR SEVERAL YEARS? 
A R I G H T . 
Q AND AT THE TIME OF THIS, YOU HAD BEEN A CONTRACTOR 
FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS? 
A YES. 
Q NOW, IN THAT TIME, THAT SIX YEARS, THE THREE YEARS 
BEFORE THIS AND ABOUT THE THREE YEARS THAT HAVE ELAPSED SINCE 
THAT TIME, HAVE YOU BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE CUSTOMS IN THE 
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION TRADE, CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES OF CONTRACTORS? 
A ONLY MY OWN. 
Q YOU NEVER TALK TO ANY OTHER CONTRACTORS ABOUT HOW 
rHEY CHARGE FOfr THEIR SERVICES? 
A NO. 
Q IN ALL THE OTHER PROJECTS YOU'VE BUILT, HAVE YOU 
RECEIVED AMOUNTS FOR PROFITS OVER AND ABOVE THE PAYMENTS YOU'VE 
RECEIVED FOR SUPERVISING THE WORK OF SUBCONTRACTORS AND 
DIRECTING AND MANAGING THE PROJECT? 
A WELL, THAT IS DIFFERENT THAN THIS PROJECT. BUT THE 
OTHER—WHILE I WAS BUILDING SINGLE HOMES, THE COSTS OF 
BUILDING A HOUSE IS--YOU DON'T CONTROL THAT. YOU CONTROL THE 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
COST OF MATERIAL AND LABOR TO A POINT TO BUILD A PROFIT AT 
THE END. 
BUT SOMETIMES THAT PROFIT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE 
END. I MEAN IT JUST IS NOT THERE. I'VE BUILT SOME HOUSES — It 
FACT AN EXAMPLE WAS IN ' 8 0 , THE SPRING OF ' 8 0 , I PAID PEOPLE 
A THOUSAND DOLLARS TO BUY THE HOUSE. 
IN ESSENCE, THAT'S WHAT IT TURNED OUT, THAT I WAS 
PAYING THEM A THOUSAND DOLLARS TO BUY THE HOUSE, BECAUSE THE 
INTEREST THAT I WAS BEING CHARGED WAS EATING ME ALIVE. IT ATI 
UP ALL THE PROFIT THAT I WOULD MAKE OR REALIZE, YOU KNOW. 
THAT'S WHEN THE INTEREST WENT UP TO 22 PERCENT AND I HADN'T 
MADE PROVISIONS FOR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
Q AND THAT'S A RISK THAT YOU USUALLY HAVE TO TAKE? 
A THIS IS A RISK. BUT IN THIS SITUATION, NO, THE 
RISK WASN'T THERE ON A PROFIT MARGIN. 
Q YOU REALLY WERE AT NO RISK OF THAT IN THIS CASE? 
A WELL, I SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN AT RISK, BECAUSE IT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN THERE, AND IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT—YOU KNOW 
SO ACTUALLY IT WAS SAFER IN THIS AREA THAN IT IS GO IMG OUT 
AND BUILDING A HOME AND THEN EXPECTING TO SELL IT. 
IF YOU SELL IT IN A SHORT TIME, YOU CAN MAKE A 
PROFIT ON I T . I F YOU S I T ON IT FOR A PERIOD OF T I M E , Y O U ' R E 
GOING TO HAVE TO PAY SOMEBODY TO GET IT OFF. IT'S JUST 
BETTER TO DO THAT. 
Q IN CASE YOU WEREN'T GOING TO SELL THAT AND RECOVER 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
YOUR PROFIT, WERE Y O U - - . 
A SELL WHAT? 
Q SELL THE BUILDING, THE EIGHT-PLEX. 
A NO. 
Q I'M TRYING TO DISTINGUISH IN MY MIND BETWEEN A 
CONTRACTOR'S FEE WHICH IS CUSTOMARY IN THIS KIND OF 
CONSTRUCTION—WHEN A DEVELOPER HAS A BUILDER BUILD A 
BUILDING, THERE'S A CERTAIN AMOUNT FOR THE HARD COST, 
THEN THERE'S A BUILDER'S FEE THAT REPRESENTS WORK IN 
SUPERVISING AND DIRECTING THE SUBCONTRACTORS AND ORDERING 
MATERIALS AND DOING THE PAPERWORK AND ALL OF THAT STUFF. 
AND THAT'S THE KIND OF COMPENSATION THAT I'VE 
SEEN BEFORE AND THAT I'M FAMILIAR WITH AS A CUSTOM AND 
PRACTICE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FOR THIS TYPE OF 
BUILDING. 
BUT THERE'S USUALLY NO IDENTIFIED ITEM FOR PROFIT 
IN THE^E FOR THE CONTRACTOR. IN THIS ONE, FOR SOME REASON, 
THE WAY THAT CONTRACT'S WRITTEN—AND YOU DRAFTED THAT—THERE'S 
A DIFFERENCE, THERE'S SOMETHING IN THERE FOR PROFIT, AND 
I'M TRYING TO GET AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT YOU INTENDED WITH 
THAT AGREEMENT, WHETHER THAT PROFIT WAS TO COMPENSATE YOU 
FOR SOMETHING OR WHETHER IT WAS INTENDED FOR SOMETHING ELSE. 
AND I'D LIKE YOU TO TELL ME ABOUT THAT IF YOU CAN. 
A THE WAY THAT CONTRACT THAT I PRESENTED COULD HAVE 
BEEN PRESENTED TWO WAYS: THE WAY IT WAS OR I COULD HAVE 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
INCREASED THE COST OF THE BUILDING TO COVER MY PROFIT. 
I WOULDN'T HAVE GOTTEN THE PROFITS OUT OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN. THE BANKS ARE NOT GOING TO ALLOW ME TO 
MAKE A PROFIT OFF THE CONSTRUCTION. 
BUT IT WAS TO SHOW THAT THAT PROFIT, THAT I WASN'T 
DOING THE BUILDING FOR FREE, THAT I WANTED TO MAKE A PROFIT 
OFF OF THE BUILDING. AND I SHOWED THAT BY—PLUS I AGREED TO 
BUILD A BUILDING FOR $875,000 PLUS A PROFIT AND AN OVERHEAD, 
AND THIS WAS AGREED UPON. 
AND THAT WAS THE ONLY WAY — I THINK THEY WERE AT 
THE MAX ON THE BANK LOAN, I'M NOT SURE. 
Q BUT YOU DIDN'T BUILD THIS FOR FREE; DID YOU? 
NO, THAT'S WHERE THE $80,000 PROFIT CAME FROM. 
WELL, YOU HAVEN'T RECEIVED ANY PART OF THAT? 
SO IT'S BEEN FREE SO FAR, OR—. 
WELL, BUT IT'S NOT BEEN FREE BECAUSE YOU HAVE 
BEEN PAID FOR SUPERVISION; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A WELL—. 
MR. MADSENt I THINK THE QUESTION IS ARGUMENTA 
MR. KINGHORN: WELL, I'M TRYING TO DISTINGUISH 
IN MY MIND BETWEEN—. 
A NO, MY SUPERVISION WAS MY LABOR. I WENT UP THERE 
EVERY DAY, MADE SURE THAT THAT BUILDING WAS BEING PROPERLY 
PUT TOGETHER, AND IT WAS THROUGH MY EXPERTISE THAT I COULD 
DO IT. 
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EXAM BY KINGHORN 
WELL, I WASN'T GOING TO GO UP THERE FOR ALMOST A 
YEAR FOR NOTHING. I JUST WASN'T GOING TO DO I T . THE $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 
WAS FOR PROFIT THAT I WAS GOING TO MAKE OFF OF THE OVERALL 
T H I N G . BUT I WAS GOING TO BE PAID FOR THE TIME THAT I WENT 
UP THERE A N D — . 
Q I N ADDIT ION TO THE PROFIT? 
A WELL, YES. I MEAN I WAS GOING T O - - . 
Q THAT 'S A L L . I ' M JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT 
THAT ALL MEANS, AND I THINK I UNDERSTAND THAT NOW, AND I 
APPRECIATE YOUR BEING PATIENT WITH ME ABOUT THAT. I DON'T 
THINK I HAVE ANYTHING ELSE. THANK YOU. 
MR. J E F F S : MR. D A N I E L S , MY NAME IS DEAN J E F F S -
ARE YOU SAVING UP FOR THE LAST? 
MS. MCCLURG: I JUST WANTED TO ASK A COUPLE OF 
QUESTIONS. DO YOU MIND? 
MR. J E F F S : NO, I THOUGHT I HEARD YOU TELL H I M — 
MS. MCCLURG: WELL, I WASN'T GOING TO. 
EXAMINATION 
MS. MCCLURG: 
Q LOOKING AT T H I S E X H I B I T 1 1 8 , THE COST BREAKDOWN 
SUMMARY, I DON'T SEE A DATE ON THERE. AM I M ISSING THAT? 
A YES, M A ' A M . I T ' S RIGHT HERE. TH IS WAS THE DATE 
THAT I SUBMITTED THIS COST BREAKDOWN TO ALL OF THE PARTIES 
INVOLVED, AND I JUST NEVER CHANGED I T . 
MR. MADSEN: THE DISBURSEMENTS WERE L ISTED 
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EXAM BY MCCLURG 
THIS WAS BEFORE WE GOT THE LOAN OR DURING THE PROCESS BEFORE 
WE GOT THE LOAN, NEAR THE END, JUST BEFORE WE GOT I T , I COULD 
HAVE BEEN—MCDONALD USED THAT FIGURE THAT THE BANK WAS WILLINC 
TO LOAN $ 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 ON THE B U I L D I N G , AND "CAN WE BUILD THE 
BUILDING FOR THAT?" 
AND THAT'S WHERE I FIGURED THIS--WELL, MY HARD COST' 
I KEPT THOSE WITHIN THAT HARD COST, YOU KNOW. THE REST OF IT 
THERE, YES, THAT WOULD BE—AND I HAD TO REVISE SOME OF THOSE 
FIGURES, BECAUSE IN A COUPLE OF THEM I WAS A L I T T L E H I G H AND, 
YOU KNOW, IT 'WAS GOING TO BE MORE ON THE SOFT THAN THE HARD 
COSTS INVOLVED. 
Q YOU MEAN YOU HAD TO REVISE THEM DURING THE COURSE 
OF CONSTRUCTION? 
A NO, NO; NO, IT WAS BETWEEN THE VERY FIRST ONE I GIV 
THEM AND THIS ONE HERE. AND I COULDN'T TELL YOU WHAT THEY 
WERE OR ANYTHING. I DO KNOW THAT IF EVERYTHING WAS TOTALED 
J P , I T CCT.ES T 0 WEIL —NOT QUITF $ ? 7 5 , 0 9 0 . 
Q IF WHAT EVERYTHING, WHAT IS TOTALED UP? 
A ALL THE COSTS, SOFT AND HARD, AND EVERYTHING IS 
TOTALED UP, AND THE INTEREST PAID, IT COMES TO LESS THAN 
$ 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 , BECAUSE THERE WAS S T I L L $ 1 3 , 0 0 0 REMAINING I N THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN WHEN I STOPPED DRAWING. 
Q ALL RIGHT. I HAVEN'T LOOKED THIS LIST OVER 
CAREFULLY. IS THE INTEREST DURING THE TERM OF THE LOAN 
INCLUDED ON THESE COSTS SOMEWHERE? 
GENERAL COURT REPORTERS 
J DALE J. OHNSON &ASSQCIATES 
Suite 700 
Newnouse Building 
Salt Lane City Utah 84111 
(801) 363 2000 
63 
MANAGING PARTNER 
C^».^«W D MiHri lov R P R 
L 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
LO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
EXAM BY JEFFS 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT DAY IT WAS YOU SUBMITTED THAT 
LAST DRAW REQUEST? 
MR. MADSEN: WELL, THAT'S--. 
A WELL, IT'S IN HERE. LIKE WE WAS JUST TALKING ABOUT, 
IT'S THE 15TH OF JUNE WAS THE LAST-
MR. MADSEN: OF WHAT YEAR? 
A — O F 1981. 
Q NOW, THEN, I TAKE IT THEN THAT ON THE 15TH OF JUNE 
YOU HAD SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED ALL THE WORK? 
A YES. 
Q AND I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED THAT BETWEEN THAT 
DATE AND THE 23RD OF JULY, 1981, THE CITY INSPECTORS IDENTIFIED 
A RAILING AND A COUPLE OF OTHER ITEMS THAT NEEDED TO BE FIXED 
AND THAT YOU COMPLETED THOSE BY THE 23RD OF JULY? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND THAT THEN FROM THAT DATE FORWARD THERE WAS 
NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOJ TO DO Of.' THE PROJECT T0 COMPLETE 
YOUP CONTRACT? 
A THAT'S RIGHT, SIR. 
Q NOW, YOU INDICATED I THINK THAT YOU CONSIDERED 
THAT WHEN YOU RECEIVED A CALL TO GO UP AND LOOK AT THE 
WATER DAMAGE, THAT THAT EXTENDED THE TIME FOR YOU FILING A 
MECHANIC'S LIEN? 
A THIS IS WHAT THE BOARD OF CONTRACTORS ADVISED ME. 
Q OKAY. AND NOW I THINK YOU SAID YOU WENT UP THERE 
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EXAM BY JEFFS 
AND LOOKED IT OVER AND CONTACTED THE INSURANCE COMPANY, BUT 
YOU DIDN'T DO ANY WORK; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A BECAUSE THEY TOLD ME TO STAY AWAY FROM IT, BACK OFF, 
THAT THERE WAS NOTHING I WAS GOING TO DO ON IT. VANCE MCDONALD 
TOLD ME THIS . 
Q SO IN FACT, THEN, YOU DIDN'T DO ANY WORK OR LABOR 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE BUILDING ITSELF IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE WATER DAMAGE OR ON THOSE DATES? 
A NO, NO. NO PHYSICAL LABOR WAS DONE OTHER THAN MY 
OWN 
Q YOU JUST WENT UP AND LOOKED IT OVER? 
A RIGHT. 
Q AND YOU ALSO CONTACTED DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN? 
A TO SEE IF THE INSURANCE ON THE BUILDING WOULD COVER 
THE DAMAGE. AND DON NIELSEN TOLD ME THAT IT WOULDN'T. 
NOW, AT THAT TIME THE REASON I BACKED OFF WHEN 
THEY TOLD ME TO BACK OFF IS BECAUSE I WAS NO LONGER IN 
CHARGE OF THE BUILDING. I TURNED IT OVER TO THIS OTHER 
ENTITY, AND--. 
Q YOU DIDN'T DO ANY OTHER THINGS IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE WATER DAMAGE THAN WHAT YOU'VE JUST TOLD ME? 
A RIGHT. 
MR. MAD SEN": I DON'T THINK THAT'S A COMPLETE 
SUMMARY, BUT I CAN RE-ASK IT ON CROSS. 
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EXAM BY JEFFS 
ANY LITTLE PROBLEM THAT WERE TO COME OUT OF NORMAL OCCURRENCES 
IN THE BUILDING. I COULD HAVE DONE THAT. 
Q BUT WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IS THAT THE THINGS YOU 
DID AT THE TIME OF THE WATER DAMAGE, IN YOUR MIND, WERE AS 
MUCH REQUIRED BECAUSE OF YOUR WARRANTY AS FOR ANY OTHER THING 
IF IT TURNED OUT TO BE A BREACH OF WARRANTY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU'RE ASKING ME, REALLY. I 
THOUGHT I ANSWERED YOU. 
Q DIDN'T YOU HAVE, IN YOUR MIND, SOME OBLIGATION 
UNDER YOUR WARRANTY TO SEE IF THAT WAS DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM—. 
A I WORRIED ABOUT IT. 
Q OKAY. 
A I WORRIED ABOUT IT, BUT--. 
Q NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
MS. MCCLURG: I DO. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MS. MCCLURG: 
Q MR. DANIELS, REFERRING AGAIN TO EXHIBIT 10, AND 
I'LL HAND YOU THAT EXHIBIT, THE BUILDING CONTRACT AGREEMENT, 
WHICH I THINK YOU STATED YOU PREPARED WHICH IS PART OF THAT 
EXHIBIT—YOU MAY HAVE GONE OVER THIS BEFORE, AND I WAS READING 
THE EXHIBIT IN THE INTERIM—AND I'M STILL NOT CLEAR, ON PAGE 
k OF THE EXHIBIT, THERE'S A REFERENCE THAT, THE THIRD LINE 
DOWN, THAT "THE CONTRACTOR FOR SAID WORK SHALL BE PAID" — I 
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EXAM BY MCCLURG 
THINK I T ' S SUPPOSED TO BE $ 7 9 7 , 0 0 0 ; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT THERE--THAT PART OF IT IS WHAT THE BANK, 
AFTER THEY TOOK THEIR PART OFF OF THE TOP OVER THE AMOUNT 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN, AFTER THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION LOAN WHICH WAS $ 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 
NOW, THE BANK FROM 7 5 - - S O THEY TOOK $ 7 8 , 0 0 0 BEFORE 
ANYONE HAD A LOAN. THEY JUST TOOK I T . 
Q THE BANK TOOK $ 7 8 , 0 0 0 OFF THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN? 
A YES, THAT'S THE WAY THAT WORKS. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT FOR? 
A I HAVE NO I D E A . THEIR SOFT COSTS, THEIR 
PERCENTAGE OF CHARGING, AND MAYBE T H I S GENTLEMAN COULD 
ANSWER I T TO YOU. 
Q NOW, WAS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THAT THE AMOUNT YOU 
WERE SUPPOSED TO SPEND FOR THE MATERIALS AND THE SUPPLIES 
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $ 7 9 7 , 0 0 0 ? 
A THAT WAS THE AMOUNT OF MONET THAT WAS AVAILABLE 
TO ME. AND IT WAS OUT OF THAT AMOUNT OF MONEY I KNEW THAT 
THERE WAS AN INTEREST CHARGE GOING TO BE COMING OUT OF T H A T . 
THERE WAS OTHER CHARGES THAT--LIKE THE SEWER AND 
THE WATER AND THE FEE THAT PARK AVENUE CHARGES, THEY HAD 
TO COME OUT OF THAT. 
MR. MADSEN: YOU MEAN PARK CITY, NOT PARK 
AVENUE? 
A YEAH, PARK CITY SERVICE FEES THAT HAD TO COME OUT 
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EXAM BY MCCLURG 
OF THAT. THAT WAS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT WAS AVAILABLE 
TO ME TO BUILD THAT BUILDING WITH, AND THAT WAS MY BUDGET. 
THE $797 ,000 WAS MY BUDGET. 
Q OKAY. THEN LOOKING BACK AT EXHIBIT 118, DOES THAT 
INCLUDE THE FIRST FOUR ITEMS HERE? 
A THAT INCLUDES--YES, THAT INCLUDES EVERYTHING < II 
THAT PAGE DOWN TO LINE 57 . 
Q OKAY. ALL RIGHT, ANC THEN YOU WERE TO BE PAID A 
PROFIT OF APPROXIMATELY $80 ,000 OVER AND ABOVE THAT AMOUNT? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHERE THAT MONEY WAS SUPPOSED TO COME 
FROM? 
A WHEN THEY SOLD THE UNIT. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING 
THAT ALL OF THOSE UNITS WERE SOLD. 
Q BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION STARTED? 
A YES. 
Q NOW, AND I KNOW YOU DISCUSSED THIS WITH MR. 
KINGHORN, BUT WOULD YOU EXPLAIN AGAIN, PLEASE, WAS THAT 
$80 ,000 SUPPOSED TO COMPENSATE YOU FOR YOUR SUPERVISION 
WORK ON THE PROJECT? 
A NO, MA'AM; THAT WAS MY PROFIT. 
Q THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO COMPENSATE YOU FOR ANY WORK 
THAT YOU DID ON THE PROJECT? 
A THAT WAS MY PROFIT. IT WAS TO COMPENSATE THE 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR-THAT BUILT THE BUILDING, AND THAT WAS HIS 
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PROFIT. LIKE ALL COMPANIES MAKE A PROFIT; THAT'S HOW THEY 
EXIST, THAT'S HOW THEY GROW, AND THAT'S HOW THEY GO FORWARD. 
THE $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 WAS FOR MY LABOR TO SUPERVISE THAT JOB 
UP THERE. 
Q SO NOW I F YOU CAN ANSWER T H I S YES OR NO, PLEASE 
DO: WAS ANY PART OF THAT $80,000 SUPPOSED TO COMPENSATE YOU 
FOR YOUR WORK ON THE PROJECT? 
A NO. 
Q ALL R I G H T . WAS I T SUPPOSED TO COMPENSATE YOU FOR 
ANY MATERIALS SUPPLIED TO THE PROJECT? 
A NO. 
MS. MCCLURG: THANK YOU. NOTHING FURTHER. 
MR. JEFFS: NOTHING FURTHER. 
MR. MADSEN: THAT 'S A L L . 
(WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 3 : 5 0 P . M . , THE 
PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A C L O S E . ) 
(TRANSCRIBED BY KIMBERLY K. ROYLANCE) 
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